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Do members of religious minorities sometimes have the right to be exempted from otherwise universally applicable laws?  The question raises issues of fairness, conscience and equality of opportunity, as well as the problem of defining what counts as a religion in the first place see (on the latter see Greenwalt 2006 vol. 1, pp.124-56).  Political philosophers have on the whole been sympathetic towards religious exemptions, though there are exceptions, notably Brian Barry (2001).  However, a good deal of philosophical work on the issue has been subsumed under the larger banner of multiculturalism – an amalgam of claims for representation, recognition and special privileges besides exemptions - which is not always helpful.  Further, much philosophical and jurisprudential discussion has focussed on three landmark US cases, the most recent of which is twenty years old.  (I discuss these cases briefly below).  More recently, US judges and lawmakers have granted hundreds of exemptions from laws, rules and regulations which have not received much theoretical attention.  Few British political philosophers have devoted much consideration to the issue; the main exceptions being Brian Barry and Peter Jones (1994).  In the last few years a number of significant cases where people have claimed that general laws or rules have discriminated against them have been heard by British courts, as well as by the European Court of Human Rights.  The British Government’s Equality Bill, due to become law in 2010, also contains numerous exemptions for religious groups.

I shall discuss some of these British cases below (a number of which raise issues not much explored by political theorists) although my aim in this chapter is not to present the legal state of play with respect to exemptions in Britain or anywhere else.  Rather, I shall outline and examine the three most fruitful philosophical frameworks for approaching the issue, each of which appeals to a different moral intuition.  Each of these frameworks has certain merits and none should be dismissed in its entirety.  However, all three arguments, I shall maintain, also labour under certain confusions and ambivalences.  I suggest that it may not be helpful to search for a general theory which divides all exemptions claims into those which are justified and those which are not.  Political philosophers might do better to clarify the moral considerations lying on each side of the issue.  I conclude with a brief examination of what some of those considerations might be. 

This last point reveals one desideratum in any account of the ethics of religious exemptions claims.  It should leave some space for judgement and for the proper consideration of a range of contextual factors.  For example, in one well-known known case of a claim of discrimination involving religious dress, Begum v. Denbigh High School (2006) where a fourteen year old Muslim girl wished to wear the jilbab to school in contravention of its uniform policy, the judges quite rightly took into account the fact that that policy had been arrived at after extensive consultation with local mosques, as well as the fact that Shabina Begum could have attended two other local schools where the jilbab would have been allowed.  These factors are missed if we frame the issue as one involving the right to wear what one wishes versus the right of an association to set its own terms for admission.

Another desideratum is that an account of religious exemptions should be nonsectarian.  It should avoid claiming that any particular religion is true, that any branch of a religion is superior to any other or represents the orthodoxy, or that religious experience in general is a ‘basic human good’ (George 1993, p.220).  While religion is indeed a basic good for some, it is also controversial and contested, and sometimes intensely personal and ineffable.  In a democracy, any argument for religious exemptions must be capable of moving non-believers as well those who hold a different faith.  It must also be publicly justifiable.  Those who stand to lose, by bearing the costs of someone else’s exemption or by having their claim for an exemption turned down, must be offered reasons they can accept as reasonable citizens.  The demand for public justification is a general goal of liberal theories, if not liberalism itself, but in the context of religious exemptions it is especially important since all exemptions, on the surface at least, give one group a special privilege not afforded to the remainder of the population.  Any argument for exemptions needs to show why the reasons for having a law for the majority are not subverted by making an exception for a minority.  What sorts of arguments could fit that bill?  To this question we now turn.


II The Argument from Fairness 

Many people who take religious requirements seriously, whether or not they observe them themselves, argue for exemptions on grounds of fairness.  It is unfair, on this view, for the law to burden members of a minority religion when no parallel burden is experienced by the majority.  How might this intuition be articulated? 

The most basic version of the argument from fairness says simply that it is unfair that the majority can engage in some common practice while a minority, on account of their religious beliefs, cannot.  Thus for example, Sikh men, unless they are granted an exemption, are unable to ride a motorcycle since their wearing of the turban means they cannot also wear a crash helmet.  It is not enough, so this argument goes, to point out that there is no law which forbids Sikh men from riding a motorbike, because the relevant notion here is not legal freedom, but actual ability.  If a Sikh man takes his religion seriously and wears a turban riding a motorbike is something he is simply unable to do.  Thus granting an exemption, while on the surface an apparent privilege (lots of motorcyclists might prefer not to have to wear turbans) is actually a way of restoring fairness.

One criticism that might be made of the argument is that many members of minority religions are immigrants who have chosen to move to a new society, and therefore arguably have some duty to adhere to its system of law.  If adherents of minority religions do not find the laws of another state sufficiently accommodating, so this objection goes, then they should not migrate there.  If they do migrate, they have to accept what they find.  This is however quite a weak criticism.  The great majority of migrants and their descendents are citizens (they are not merely residents).  As such, they are entitled to equal treatment under the law.  Whatever length of time a person has been resident in a state she migrated to, if she is a citizen, and other citizens are extended a benefit – religious accommodation - which is not offered to her, then she has a legitimate complaint.  

Courts in the UK have not always been impressed by the argument from fairness.  We have already we encountered the legal reasoning employed in Begum v. Denbigh High School, where Shabina Begum could have appealed to the fact that non-Muslim girls were able to attend the School whereas, so long as she held the convictions she did, she was not.  A case with a similar structure is Ahmad v. UK (1982) which involved a Muslim schoolteacher who demanded paid time off work on a Friday afternoon in order to attend a mosque for congressional prayer.  Mr Ahmad could have argued that, while non-Muslims were able to work the whole of Friday, he was not.  In fact, the courts were not sympathetic to Mr Ahmad’s argument, arguing that his refusal to work the hours requested of him was more apposite than his religious belief.  (Similar reasoning can be observed in Stedman v. UK (1997) where (​http:​/​​/​www.bailii.org​/​cgi-bin​/​redirect.cgi?path=​/​eu​/​cases​/​ECHR​/​1997​/​178.html" \o "Link to BAILII version​) the Court found against a Christian woman required to work on Sundays).  This may seem a little unfair since Mr Ahmad may have simply regarded it as unconscionable to work during Friday prayer time, in the same way that Miss Begum regarded it as unconscionable not to wear the jilbab or a Sikh man could not countenance not wearing his turban.  On the other hand, there is no doubt that all these individuals could have participated in the activities which, in the particular circumstances they faced, came into conflict with their beliefs.  It depends very much on what we mean by having an opportunity.  In his critique of religious exemptions, Barry assumes an objectivist, legal notion of opportunity, defined without reference to individuals’ beliefs or values (Barry 2001, p.45).  This enables Barry to argue that Sikh men face the same opportunities in society as everyone else, and like everyone else, they must make their choice from the opportunity set available to them.  At the opposite point on the spectrum, one could define opportunuity in highly culturally-laden terms, with full reference to individuals’ beliefs, values, cultural heritage and the like.  On this view, a woman who had from an early age been socialised into accepting the role of wife and mother and nothing else, would lack the opportunity to pursue a career.  This seems to me to make the opposite mistake to Barry.  It would be more accurate to say that, though this woman has the opportunity to pursue a career, it is difficult for her to take the opportunity; and in a similar way we might say that while Sikh men have the opportunity to ride a motorbike it is difficult for them to do so (notwithstanding that they might tell us that it is impossible for them to do so).  The point here is simply that the argument from fairness assumes a fairly subjective notion of opportunity, not so far removed from the culturally-laden one I rejected, and, while it would be a mistake to reject this tout court and embrace Barry’s alternative, we should also recognise its difficulties.

One thought we might have about the Ahmad v. UK and Begum v. Denbigh High School cases is that, if people with strong religious beliefs are not prepared to do anything that contravenes their beliefs, then they must accept the consequences, especially when they impose costs on others.  While we should not force a person to do something she regards as unconscionable, in other words, neither should we allow her to evade responsibility for her beliefs.  The intuition underlying this thought is that, while people do not choose their beliefs, they nonetheless remain accountable for them.  In a thoughtful discussion of the Ahmad v. UK case, Peter Jones (1994) argues that Mr Ahmad has a responsibility to bear the consequences of his beliefs, a principle which counts against his colleagues having a duty to re-organise their timetables in order to enable him to attend Friday prayers.  However, matters are not so simple because, while we can hold Mr Ahmad responsible for his beliefs, we cannot hold him responsible for the fact that in the UK Friday is a work day.  In general, the consequences of belief are not uniquely determined by the individual who bears them, and this mitigates the consequences of belief principle somewhat.  Notwithstanding that, it we take the principle seriously, then it too will weaken the force of the argument from fairness.  That people should bear (at least some of) the consequences of their beliefs is an independent consideration of fairness, and  therefore the argument that it is unfair if the majority can engage in a practice which a minority cannot, on account of their religious beliefs cannot be presented in that simple form.

To see how these two considerations weaken the argument we can consider the case of Eweida v British Airways (2008) where an Employment Appeals Tribunal upheld the ruling of an earlier Employment Tribunal that a Christian employee of British Airways, who wished to wear a small cross in contravention of its uniform policy, had not been discriminated against.  Ms Eweida could argue that it was unfair that people who have no desire to display religious symbols could work for  British Airways, while she could not.  Against this, we could point out, first, that, she nonetheless could have worked for British Airways and not  worn a cross (and of course wearing a cross is not a requirement of Christian belief), and second that, if she chooses to wear a cross, then she should accept the consequences of her belief (and there are many employers who do allow their employees to wear crosses and other religious symbols at work).  

Another version of the argument from fairness has a rather different structure.  What we might call the balance of justice argument applies to cases where the law prohibits a certain practice in order to protect certain interests which count from the standpoint of justice.  The balance of justice argument claims that it is less unjust to make an exemption for a certain group, thereby leaving certain interests unprotected, than it is to uphold an exceptionless law which fails to accommodate the interests of the group claiming the exemption.  Thus Jews and Muslims might argue that the injustice inflicted on animals slaughtered according to kosher or halal requirements, which cause the animal to bleed to death, is less than the injustice inflicted on them were they prohibited from slaughtering animals in the way their religion requires (cf. Casal 2003, pp.17-19).

One consideration which the balance of justice argument seems to omit, however, is that there may be a strong independent reason of justice for law to apply universally to all citizens, separate from the fact that citizens have the same interests of justice.  All citizens are liable to suffer the ill effects of ingesting hallucinogens and that is a good reason why laws that ban cannabis or peyote (see below), if they are justified, should apply to all.  But besides that reason, there is also a compelling reason for the law to apply to all.  In a democracy, no citizens should be above the law.  Taking this into account might shift the scales of justice for in addition to the importance of the interests that a liberty-limiting law seeks to protect, there is also now an independent consideration in favour of all citizens being equally subject to the law.  Indeed, it is the latter, not the former which is the source of the complaint that exemptions for religious groups represent an arbitrary privilege.  


III The Argument from Conscience 

The freedom of conscience argument says that religious exemptions help avoid burdening people’s consciences.  The basic idea is that legal exemptions are justified if, in their absence, an individual would be forced to do (or refrain from doing) something she regards as unconscionable.  Conscience has of course a long history in the theory and practice of liberalism.  It speaks of human beings as autonomous agents with convictions that are authentically their own.  Conscience seems central to familiar liberal rights as freedom of belief and freedom of association: it is wrong to force individuals to participate in practices they regard as unconscionable (Kukathas 2003).  Moreover, since everyone has some convictions and can understand what conscience is an appeal to it does not seem sectarian.

In her recent Liberty of Conscience (2008) the American philosopher Martha Nussbaum presents the following argument from conscience to exemptions:

From the respect we have for the person’s conscience, that faculty of inquiring and searching, it follows that we ought to respect the space required by any activity that has the general shape of searching for the ultimate meaning of life except when that search violates the rights of others or comes up against some other compelling state interest (Nussbaum, 2008, p.169).

Nussbaum essentially wants to defend the US Supreme Court’s approach to exemptions, at least between 1963 and 1990.  The 1963 case of  Sherbert v. Verner is commonly held to inaugurate the Court’s accommodationist phase where exemptions from laws that otherwise burdened people’s consciences were granted provided the Court was satisfied there was no compelling state interest that the law promoted.  Adele Sherbert, a Seventh Day Adventist, who worked in the Spartan textile mill was asked by her employer, on pain of losing her job, to work on Saturdays when economic contraction led to the Spartan and other local mills to require their employees to work six days per week.  Saturday worship, however, is a requirement of Seventh Day Adventist belief.  The Court found that, by refusing to work on Saturdays, Mrs Sherbert had not voluntarily relinquished her employment.  In the landmark Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) case the Court upheld the claims of three Amish families led by Jonas Yoder that by requiring their children to remain at school beyond eighth grade (age fourteen), the state of Wisconsin had violated their constitutional right to freedom of religious conscience.  The families had claimed that, were there children to be subject to the final two years of compulsory education, they would absorb the values of secularism, materialism and individualism to which the Amish were deeply antithetical.  However, in Employment Division v. Smith (1990) the Court found against a claimant, Al Smith, who had been sacked from his job as an alcohol counsellor in Oregon for ingesting peyote, a powerful hallucinogen, even though taking peyote was central to the tradition of the Native American Church to which Smith belonged.  The Court argued that a blanket ban on peyote did not discriminate against those who took it for reasons of religious tradition and practice.  This marked the end of the Court’s accommodationist phase, and the beginning of an era where only a weaker nondiscrimination test was applied.

One thing which Adele Sherbert, Al Smith and Jonas Yoder all had in common was that they possessed strong convictions, and this sits oddly with Nussbaum’s interpretation of conscience as the ‘faculty of inquiring and searching’.  Although each of them may have interpreted their life as a search, it seems more apposite to say that they had a set of answers articulated and made coherent by their system of religious belief.  Without strong practical beliefs, religious or otherwise, after all, we can’t explain the wrongness of forcing someone to do something unconscionable such as work on a day they regard as holy.  Why does Nussbaum construe conscience this way?  A clue is provided in her discussion of what the criteria of religiosity are.  According to her, ‘religion concerns what one might call ultimate questions, questions of life and death, the meaning of life, life’s ethical foundation, and so forth’ (Nussbaum 2008, p.168; cf. Greenawalt 2006 vol. 1, pp.124-56).  In reply to the query that non-religious people too might have views on ultimate questions, Nussbaum willingly concedes the point.  ‘[T]here is’, she says, ’no principled way to exclude individualistic searches [for life’s meaning]’ (Nussbaum 2008, p.170).  I interpret this last statement, as a desire, on Nussbaum’s part, not to interpret conscience in a sectarian way that would in principle exclude non-theists.  Further evidence for this is contained in her discussion of United States v. Seeger (1965) where the  Supreme Court (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Supreme_Court_of_the_United_States" \o "Supreme Court of the United States​) ruled that the exemption from the military draft (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Military_draft" \o "Military draft​) for conscientious objectors (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Conscientious_objector" \o "Conscientious objector​) did not require that they profess believe in a Supreme Being.

However, it is not clear that Nussbaum needs to be interpret freedom of conscience in this way in order to avoid the charge of sectarianism.  In her discussion of the issue, Amy Gutmann writes ‘[a]lthough some religious and secular citizens diverge in what they regard as the source of their ultimate ethical commitments, they can still converge in understanding and experiencing their ethical commitments as binding on the will (2003, p.170).  Is this correct?  Gutmann’s argument is plausible if commitments binding on the will are interpreted as duties.  Everyone knows what a duty is.  Moreover, through interpreting the demands of religious belief as duties, this view arguably captures their moral weight and pre-emptory force.  However, there are many varieties of duties and it is not clear that the kinds of duties which strong believers regard themselves as under are of a type that can be straightforwardly recognised by those who do not have those kinds of convictions.  In particular, religious duties are not (or not in the first instance) owed to other people, but rather seem to be a mixture of duties owed to a supreme being and, possibly, duties owed to oneself, the latter insofar as people labour under a duty to be a good Christian, good Muslim and so on.  Non-religious duties, by contrast, are owed to other people, or at least other living things which inhabit the earth.  I suggest that this makes it harder for non-believers to appreciate their binding force.  

In addition, some atheists may believe that  a religious person’s life would go better if she did not meet at least some the duties she perceives herself to have, especially when those duties set back the interests of herself or others.  For example some secular liberals have argued that Muslim women would be better off not wearing a headscarf since, they argue, the headscarf is symbol of their subservient status.  It seems rather harsh for an atheist to claim that the religious person’s life would go better were she to be prevented from meeting all the duties she perceives herself to have since, in general, our lives do go better if we are able to meet our felt duties (cf. Bou-Habib 2006, pp.117-121).  However, it does not seem unreasonable for an atheist to believe that the religious person’s life would ultimately go better were she to recognise the falsity of her beliefs, and it may be that failing to meet some of her perceived religious duties (not attending church, for example) would be one way that might come about.  In general, then, while I agree with Gutmann that non-religious people can often understand the nature and binding force religious people’s duties, they cannot always do so, and hence her position may be more sectarian than it at first appears. 

There is a further issue with the freedom of conscience argument whether one adopts Nussbaum’s ‘faculty of searching’ or Gutmann’s ‘binding on the will’ version of it.  Recall that on Gutmann’s and Nussbaum’s view the case for religious exemptions is only a prima facie one; it may be overturned by a compelling state interest or by the rights of others.  (The latter is her addition to the Supreme Court’s accommodationist test, although no doubt the Court would regard citizens’ rights as constituting a compelling state interest).  One could argue that in Employment Division v. Smith there was indeed a compelling state interest in minimising drug use.  In fact, the Court did not see the matter this way although in a minority opinion Justice Sandra Day O’Connor argued that there was.  Article Nine of the European Convention on Human Rights has a more compendious list.  It states that limits may be placed on religious expression ‘as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others’ (ECHR, 1952, Art. 9).  This approach, however, has in common with Nussbaum’s and the Supreme Court’s approach that it presents a balancing test where the interest in religious liberty is weighed against a number of competing values.  In practice, however, Courts have often taken a rather more nuanced view of the issue and have drawn on a range of further  considerations.  In Begum v. Denbigh High School, since other schools with a less restrictive dress code policy existed in the area, Shabina Begum’s continued attendance at Denbigh High School could be interpreted as a voluntary choice.  In her case, the Court implicitly drew on a distinction between cases where a person’s obligation to obey a particular rule or law is simply unavoidable and cases where the duties a law entails can be avoided simply by putting oneself in a situation where that rule or law is no longer relevant.  The obligation to obey the law is universal, of course, but the extent to which we interdict with any particular law is to some degree a matter of choice.  We have also encountered Jones’s responsibility for bearing the costs of one’s belief principle may also weaken the force of prima facie exemptions claims based on the principle of respect for a person’s freedom of conscience.  

Nussbaum argues that such is the importance of freedom of conscience that it should be afforded special protection.  Yet once we look at some actual cases it becomes clear that things are a little more complicated since how far freedom of conscience weighs in the balance depends upon other factors such as how easily a person could avoid contact with a law and their responsibility to bear the costs of their beliefs.  This does not mean that the freedom of conscience argument is simply incorrect.  Arguably, any defence of religious exemptions must engage with conscience in some way.  But at least as presented by Nussbaum the freedom of conscience argument is incomplete since there are other relevant considerations of justice that it fails to incorporate.       


IV The Argument from Equality of Opportunity

The third approach we shall consider appeals to considerations of equality of opportunity.  Different authors have made the equality of opportunity argument in different ways, but the general form such arguments take is to appeal to some good of justice which people ought to have equal opportunities to enjoy, and then to maintain that absent an exemption some groups of people have fewer opportunities than others.

One way of making the equality of opportunity argument is to advance the general claim that individuals should have equality of opportunity to enjoy well-being, religion being an important source of well-being for many people (Bou-Habib 2006, p.111).  The good of justice on this version of the argument is well-being.  Any person prevented from being able to pursue their religion as they wish because of some legal obstacle has less opportunity to enjoy well-being than other persons.  Granting them an exemption from the law, although an apparent privilege, is in fact merely a means to equalise their opportunity to enjoy well-being.  Worth noting about this argument is that because everyone has the opportunity to enjoy well-being, if it could be foreseen that the result of granting an exemption would be to set back the opportunity for a third party to enjoy well-being then that would count against it.  A potential exemption would only be granted if it better promoted overall equality of opportunity to enjoy well-being than denying the exemption.

The fact that there are many other sources of well-being besides religious experience raises a problem for this version of the equality of opportunity argument.  On one interpretation of well-being, the different constituents of a person’s well-being can be traded off against each other.  For example a person less happy with their dull and repetitive job might regard their loving family as a source of solace.  If we adopt this version of well-being, however, then we could compensate a person unable to observe the demands of her religion as she perceived it, not by granting an exemption, but by improving her life in some other respect, for example by giving her a substantial cash grant.  It doesn’t take much knowledge of religious exemptions cases to appreciate that very few plaintiffs would be happy with that alternative.  Although we may be prepared to trade off success in different areas of our life to some degree, this understanding of well-being betrays its limited understanding of human psychology in its assumption that we always can.  What someone who claims an exemption wants is an exemption and nothing else.  As Andrew Shorten (forthcoming) points out, this argument fails to capture what is distinctively burdensome about the denial of a religious exemption.  The problem for the equality of opportunity to enjoy well-being argument is that if we endorse the alternative pluralistic view – that the different constituents of well-being cannot be traded off against one another – that does not support exemptions either.  For on the pluralistic view, since the components of well-being are now incommensurable, we are no longer able to say with confidence that one person has less opportunity to enjoy well-being than another.     

A more promising version of the equality of opportunity argument has a narrower scope.  It says simply that people should have an equal opportunity to pursue their religious or cultural commitments (Miller 2002; Quong 2006).  This version of the argument offers a clear and persuasive account of the burden of generally applicable laws for people with religious beliefs.  The most natural way of interpreting the burden which Mr Ahmad or Mrs Sherbert laboured under was that they did not have the same opportunity to treat as special one day of the week which the majority of Christian believers, not required to work on Sundays, were able to.  By granting an exemption, parity of opportunity to pursue one’s core commitments is achieved.  

This version of the equality of opportunity argument also stands in need of some sort of balancing test since an exemption could also set back the interests of a third party in some way.  In Williamson v. Secretary of State for Education (2005) (​http:​/​​/​www.bailii.org​/​cgi-bin​/​markup.cgi?doc=​/​uk​/​cases​/​UKHL​/​2005​/​15.html" \t "_blank​) the House of Lords dismissed the Article 9 appeal of the teachers and parents at a number of Christian schools that inflicting limited corporal punishment on pupils, banned in the UK since 1987, was central to Christian doctrine as they understood it.  This could be interpreted as a basic rights test.  Other cases are not so simple.  A more recent case, which may yet be appealed, highlights the fact that the wrongfulness of a claim to  pursue one’s religious commitments cannot always be captured in the language of basic rights.  This is Ladelle v. London Borough of Islington (2008) where (​http:​/​​/​www.bailii.org​/​uk​/​cases​/​UKEAT​/​2008​/​0453_08_1912.html" \t "_blank​) a Christian registrar claimed that she was discriminated against and harassed by her employer because of her refusal, on religious grounds, to perform civil partnership ceremonies.  It could be argued Ms Ladelle’s conscientious refusal did not prejudice the ability of same sex couples to enjoy a civil partnership ceremony since every other registrar at her place of employment was willing to perform them.  That, however, does not seem to get to the nub of the matter and it is not how the Employment Appeals Tribunal treated the case.  They drew attention to the fact that Ms Ladelle had signed the Council’s anti-discrimination policy document, and whether she had signed it or not, there is a powerful argument that every employee is under a duty of non-discrimination.

These two cases illustrate that the extent to which narrower version of the equality of opportunity argument supports exemptions depends upon a range of factors - basic rights, nondiscrimination, others’ non-religious opportunities – that lie outside the argument.  That is not necessarily a weakness since proponents of the argument will obviously claim that equality of religious opportunity, even equality of opportunity per se, is not the whole of justice.  The argument has to be inserted into a larger set of moral considerations.  Two more of these considerations we have already encountered.  One is Jones’s principle that people have a responsibility to bear the consequences of their beliefs.  This principle offers support to the argument that, if Ms Ladelle was that unhappy about performing civil partnerships, she might do best to consider alternative employment.  The other is the principle – we might call it the voluntarist principle – which considers it of moral relevance that individuals can sometimes avoid interdiction with a law or rule without much cost.  In the Ladelle case this is not relevant since she had been a registrar for some years before the 2004 Civil Partnerships Act came into force.  But at other times it is relevant, for example where a person takes up educational or employment opportunities in full knowledge that an institution’s dress code proscribes her wearing something central to her belief (and where a good number of other schools or employers do not have this rule). 






That ends my survey of arguments for religious exemptions.  As I said at the start, I do not think there is a knock down argument against any of them.  However, the argument from fairness and argument from conscience both seem, in important ways, incomplete The equality of opportunity argument, by contrast, has the advantage that it evaluates claims for legal exemptions by the light of a larger theory of justice.  I noted that it seems not to capture what is distinctively burdensome about generally applicable laws, but this will not be a weakness for anyone who thinks that there is nothing distinctively burdensome.  After all, many people besides religious adherents enjoy fewer opportunities than they are entitled to according to principles of justice.

Yet the equality of opportunity argument, I suggested, needs supplementing with a number of other considerations all of which involve a consideration of the particular case at issue. This point is important for it suggests that it may not be possible, and even if it is possible, it may not be desirable to seek to arrive at a general theory of religious exemptions which contains a set number of principles which can be placed in lexical order so as to deduce whether any claim for an exemption is justified or not.  It seems to me, although I will not defend this claim, that there will always be cases which present relevant considerations not capturable by such principles.  A further reason for eschewing the ambition of arriving at a general theory is that it is highly desirable that any account of exemptions be one that could actually be put to use by judges and lawmakers who have to decide these issues on the ground.  This is not a point about the greater desirability of non-ideal over ideal political theory, but instead an acknowledgment that exemptions claims arise in our actually existing far from ideal world, a world where the laws which groups claim exemptions from may not be just, in part, but not only, because they discriminate against minority groups.  What philosophers can most usefully do is clarify the normative considerations which, in different circumstances, count for or against exemptions claims.

Notwithstanding the non-ideal, contextual strategy I am recommending, however, it seems to me that any normative approach to exemptions does stand in need of some account of the burden that religious people face when confronted with a general law that inhibits the free exercise of their faith as they interpret it.  Unless an individual is burdened in some way by a law, it is very difficult if not impossible to develop even a prima facie argument to the effect that the general application of that law is unjust.  Granted, then, that individuals are burdened in meeting their twin desires to exercise their religion and obey the law, how do we then make a judgement about the justice of granting an exemption?  Only, I suggest, by asking a series of questions which are not united around any particular principle or theory.  One of these will be how far the person claiming the exemption identifies with the beliefs which cause her to be burdened, and how far they are central to her self-conception.  In general, the more central to a person’s identity a set of beliefs, the more she will be burdened by a law that comes into conflict with her desire to express those beliefs.  Another question is whether the relevant law specifically does accommodate majority religious belief; if it does then that too strengthens the case for an exemption on grounds of reciprocity.  Perhaps, though this is more controversial, it would also count in favour of an exemption if there had been a history of discrimination and intolerance against a minority religious group. 

On the minus side of the ledger, the more an individual is responsible for putting herself in a situation where she comes into conflict with a law, the more her case for an exemption is weakened.  Likewise, if granting an exemption would foreseeably shift costs onto third parties that also weakens the case for an exemption on the principle that individuals are responsible for bearing the costs of their own beliefs.  There are, finally, cases where granting an exemption would make it harder for others to live by the law, not because there is a cost imposed on them, but because the beliefs underlying the desire of a person not to live by the law do not treat them with equal concern and respect.  In a democracy, people are free to believe what they wish, but they have a responsibility as citizens not to act on beliefs which fail to treat others with equal concern and respect.  (This seems to me a relevant consideration in the Ladelle v. Islington case). (​http:​/​​/​www.bailii.org​/​uk​/​cases​/​UKEAT​/​2008​/​0453_08_1912.html" \t "_blank​)  I do not claim that this is an exhaustive list of considerations on either the plus or the minus side; there may be others besides.

To illustrate how this approach might work in action, let us consider a final legal case, Ghai v. Newcastle City Council  (​http:​/​​/​www.bailii.org​/​ew​/​cases​/​EWHC​/​Admin​/​2009​/​978.html" \t "_blank​)(2009) where Davender Kumar Ghai, a Hindu man, was denied the right to have his body cremated on an open pyre after his death in contravention of the law.  Mr Justice Cranston who heard the case gave a great deal of weight to the argument that large numbers of people would be offended by cremation in the open air.  Mr Ghai conceded this but argued that with time, education and publicity that offence would diminish.  Even if offence is a relevant consideration, however, it is certainly not the only one.  It seems to me relevant that Mr Ghai had strong views on what happened to his body after his death, that his surviving relatives could do nothing to avoid being subject to the law on cremation, that the law as it stands accommodates beliefs about burial (Islam forbids cremation and some other religions disapprove of it), that no one besides possibly employees of the crematorium was required to bear any extra costs (unless mere offence counts as a cost) and that if his cremation went ahead no one would fail to be treated with equal concern and respect.
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